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This paper reports an analysis of the characteristics of political campaign managers
within the framework of leadership theory. Furthermore, as an outcome of this research I
will present a theoretical framework for the further study of campaign managers as
leaders.
As a research subject, political campaigns have been a topic of great interest in
recent years. Many scholars have addressed such issues as campaign fundraising,
consultants, and the media and political campaigns. However, very little scholarly
research has been conducted regarding campaign managers. In fact, a study conducted by
Martin ( 1993, p. 10) chastises scholars for " ... a regrettable shortage of material for those
seeking information about present-day electioneering ... " For the purposes of this
research, I define a campaign manager as the chief administrative officer within a
campaign, who directs and coordinates the internal decision making process of the
campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 96).
Through this paper I will address not only the subject of campaign managers, but
the relationship between managers and candidates, the relationship between managers and
the rest of the campaign organization, and the role of campaign managers as leaders.
Though many trade journals and news magazines, such as Time and Newsweek have
reported what are essentially case studies of campaign managers in national presidential
elections, there has been very little synthesis and generalization of this information to other
national campaign organizations, or to campaign organizations at the state and local levels.
Even scholarly studies that do minimally focus upon the campaign organization or the
campaign manager stress that scholars "... ought to focus more upon the elites who run
the campaigns" (Margolis, 1985, p. 124). In essence, I hope to provide a scholarly,

leadership-based focus on the campaign organization and a very important, but neglected
actor within that organization, the campaign manager.
This paper also attempts to offset the tendency in scholarly studies to
overemphasize the subject matter of why candidates win or lose and under-emphasize the
study of the leadership qualities of campaign managers. For example, Corsino ( 1985, p.
252) completed a study on campaign organizations in which he defined campaign success
in the manager's view as" ... accomplishing those activities which would lead to the
accumulation of the majority of votes on election day." Instead of a success-oriented
approach, I seek to address what it means for a campaign to be an effective organization
and the manager to be an effective leader. More specifically, I believe that it is certainly
possible that a campaign manager may fail to lead his organization to win the election, but
he can still foster an effective organization that is clearly structured, emphasizes cohesive
teamwork, and maintains a strong and consistent vision.
A third motivating force behind this analysis is to integrate the study of leadership
into the study of political campaigns and to elucidate the leadership roles and functions of
campaign managers. Given the general paucity of literature that focuses on the position of
the campaign manager, I do not intend to test a single leadership theory in this research.
Rather, I seek to isolate specific and relevant concepts in the leadership literature and
apply those concepts towards creating a theoretical framework for the further study of
campaign managers as leaders. More specifically, I plan to isolate various themes of an
effective campaign and characterize the leadership roles of the campaign manager with
regard to those theme. Hopefully, this analysis will indicate whether the term "campaign

manager" is a result of cavalier semantics or a true reflection of the administrative as
compared to leadership duties that a campaign manager should perform.
In summary, this paper joins the study ofleadership with the study of political
campaigns. It seeks to create a leadership-based framework for explaining the leadership
behaviors performed by campaign managers in their efforts to facilitate an effective
campaign. Therefore, I have chosen the following organizational structure for my
analysis: A review of the literature, a discussion of research methodology, a description of
the data that was collected, and the presentation of a theoretical framework which may be
useful for guiding future research in this area.
Literatur_e_R.eview: Campaign_M_anagex
My literature review progressed through two steps. First, 1 reviewed the literature
on campaign managers and subsequently I reviewed the literature on leadership theory.
My review of the literature on campaign managers focused on campaign management and
electioneering. Much of the literature that I found was published in newspapers and
magazines, and not in scholarly journals and the like. All of the literature on leadership
theory that I reviewed, however, is based on a survey of leadership-based textbooks and
the scholarly information included in those textbooks. With regard to the literature on
campaign managers, I isolated twelve themes that I hypothesized to be most salient to
effective campaign management and highly correlated with contemporary leadership
theory. With regard to the leadership literature, I isolated four concepts that I believed
could best be applied to the themes that I deduced from the campaign management
literature_ My literature review also led me to isolate four categorical themes that best
represent what it means to run an effective campaign, especially with regard to the role of

the campaign manager. I then used those themes as possible criteria through which to
evaluate the campaign manager's role as a leader or manager within the campaign
organization and to isolate various common characteristics that represent strong
leadership and/or management on the part of a campaign manager.
Several issues related to my analysis warrant identification. First, as noted above,
the categories/criteria that I developed to guide my analysis represent common themes
that I deduced from the literature; within the literature I found few scholarly
generalizations regard.ing the effectiveness of campaign organizations. Additionally, these
categories do overlap one another, but for presentation purposes I treat them as relatively
conceptually distinct. I was able to isolate additional categorical themes, which can be
characterized as follows: Mutual respect and trust within the organization, facilitation of
grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of experience, emphasis on
opposition research, level of energy, level of confidence, and ability to control campaign
leaks. Though I sought information regarding these categories during my data collection,
I focused on the four criteria within my literature review on campaign effectiveness.
Combined, the twelve criteria are used to assess the role of the campaign manager as a
leader, and explain the campaign manager's leadership behaviors. Therefore, the
following categories are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive, but they do provide a
fairly representative view of the extent of the work in this area of study.

Teamwork!Comm1micatio11
Throughout the literature on political campaigns, teamwork is a consistent
characteristic labeled as important in defining what is an effective campaign organization.
Furthermore, the campaign manager is often identified as a key player in influencing and

enhanciing the atmosphere of teamwork in the campaign organization. For example, a
post�election analysis in U.S. News and World Report, cited President Reagan's first
presidential campaign in 1980 as an example of how much influence the campaign
manager has on teamwork and how important teamwork is as a standard for judging
campaign effectiveness. During the early phase of Reagan's campaign, there was a strong
degree of infighting and jealousy among staff However, after Reagan fired his campaign
manager, John Sears, and hired William Casey to replace him, Casey facilitated an
increased level of positive and open communication, leading to a much more cohesive
organizational atmosphere (Sanhoff, 1980, p. 68).
Other literature on political campaigns illustrate that campaign leaders, including
the campaign manager, who try to excessively control the campaign may inhibit progress
towards productivity. One example that epitomizes inhibited campaign productivity
resulting from excessive control on the part of the campaign manager concerns Scott
Reed, Bob Dole's 1996 Presidential campaign manager. One aide criticized Reed for
having excessively controlled the information networks within the campaign and " ... and
he sought to do it with a personal management style in which he works with two or three
trusted friends while keeping everything close to the chest" (Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). I
hypothesize that the result of such a management style is an organization, as a whole, that
is less informed. For example, the National Journal, cited Don Sipple and Mike Murphy,
Dole's media consultants, as criticizing campaign manager Scott Reed for cutting them
out of strategy discussions and refusing to open up communication networks (Barnes.
I 996, p. 1986). As a result, the campaign became bogged down in struggles over
campaign strategy, and the advertising consultants resigned. Both elections reveal how

much of a benefit or detriment a campaign manager can be as a facilitator of strong,
cohesive internal campaign communication.
Finally, the campaign manager's relationship with the candidate can also have a
strong influence on the atmosphere of cohesiveness within the organization, and hence the
effectiveness of that organization. Returning to Bob Dole's 1996 campaign, post-election
analysis criticized him for being ". . . mysterious and uncommunicative, often biting and
rarely encouraging. . . He liked to have competing power centers in the campaign and
would play one against the other" (Newsweek, 1996, p. 106). This type of attitude may
result in an unfriendly working environment, and therefore the campaign manager, as the
chief administrative officer, may be the best person to stop the candidate from fostering
and reinforcing such an environment. Actions such as these may distract staff from the
task at hand, running the campaign. An article in a business magazine argues that an
effective campaign manager can use his/her power and position within the organization to
at least persuade, if not force the candidate to focus his/her attention, and consider how
such behavior may have detrimental effects on the campaign (Knapper, 1996, p. 28).
In summary, literature on the issue of teamwork in campaign organizations seems
limited and incomplete because it primarily focuses on Presidential campaigns.
Furthermore, the literature does not isolate leadership techniques through which the
campaign manager may be able to facilitate open communication, set a positive tone for
the campaign environment, and facilitate cohesive intra-organizational relationships. Such
issues require further study with particular emphasis on determining the leadership
techniques through which a campaign manager can affect the clarity and openness of
communication networks, improve the team's communication, the cohesiveness of the

organization, and maintain a strong, cohesive co-leader relationship with the candidate.
Many of these behaviors may be integral in creating a framework for understanding why a
campaign manager can also be a campaign leader, and how we know that he or she is such
a leader.

CJrKanizationaf Hierarchy
Campaign managers may play a role in creating or facilitating interoffice
coordination and a clear organizational hierarchy that is understood by members of the
organization. In fact, clear organizational structure strongly complements an open
communication network and facilitates the efficient flow of information within the
campaign. Corsino's (1985, p. 256-257) study of a mayoral campaign in Massachusetts
revealed that when campaign managers fail to clarify the duties and responsibilities of
campaign members, those followers may not understand whether or not there is a
structural mechanism for the flow of information from the bottom to the top of the
organization. The present study further explores this issue and attempts to determine if
there is validity behind the belief that lack of clarity in the hierarchy of the campaign
organization results in demoralized participants or staff members. Furthermore, the
question remains as to whether a lack of empowerment and participation within the
decision making process for the staff will result in decreased staff productivity.
Refocusing on the responsibilities of participants within campaigns, some literature
on campaigns has addressed the link between the organizational structure of a campaign
and the responsibilities of the actors within the campaign. Runkel's book, based on an
analysis of the 1988 Presidential election, uses Michael Dukakis' campaign to hone in on
understanding this link. Michael Dukakis' manager hired and dismissed so many media

advisers that "instead of a few simple themes there was a changing lineup of muddled
ones. Instead of an organization chart that bespoke clear strategy, there were ill-defined
responsibilities" (Runkel, 1989, p. 83). In contrast, George Bush's candidacy in 1988 was
characterized by efficiency and an organization with designated areas of responsibility
(Wayne, 1992, p. 178). Evidently, when responsibilities are constantly changing, the
result may lead to dual accomplishments of tasks, wasted time, and overall slow
procedural processes within the campaign.
Clarity and designation of responsibilities are not the only important factors with
regard to organizational hierarchy. Martin's (1993, p. 89) study on campaign
management compares campaign organizations to diffuse social systems "... that must be
carefully structured and organized to encourage maximum participation, and to make the
best use of the experience, skills, and talents of those volunteers and staff involved in the
campaign." She seems to hint that the chaotic nature of campaign organizations generally
may be offset by organizational discipline.
With regard to the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy, some scholars
have isolated the role of the campaign manager in creating and stimulating a large
volunteer effort and strong fieldwork. This is especially emphasized within the literature
on national Presidential campaigns, but it may also be important in lower level campaigns,
as well. Volunteers and fieldwork are important for at least two reasons according to the
literature on the subject. First, as suggested in Wayne's (1992, p. 117) book on the J 992
Presidential election, the mobilization of voters often occurs as a result of phone banks,
door-to-door campaigning, and local fundraising, and the center of focus of any campaign
is mobilization of voters. Evidence for the importance of voter mobilization, shows that

get out the vote efforts have resulted in three to five percent differences in final election
outcomes (Martin, 1993, p. 124). An adept campaign manager may realize this, and
create a plan for an organization with extensive manpower and regionally distributed
manpower to facilitate the success of voter mobilization efforts. The second reason for
the importance of large volunteer efforts is that many experts within the campaign field
believe that fieldwork determines whether one wins or loses. In order not to
underestimate the importance of this factor in a campaign, it is important to note that
within a campaign organization" ... 75 to 80 percent of the full-time staff labors in the
field" (Sanoff, I 980, p. 68). These statistics make it easy to understand why national level
campaigns may be easily crippled by poor organization and mobilization of staff and
volunteers.
Another area of organizational focus, are the lateral coalitions that campaigns build
with their respective political parties. Some practitioners believe that campaign managers
play an important strategic role in building such coalitions. For example, Susan Estrich,
Michael Dukakis' campaign manager in 1988, argues that organization of state campaigns
is a major duty of the campaign manager in order to build a unified national organization
(Runkel, 1989, p. 93-94). This indicates that in national campaigns the effective campaign
manager needs to have a plan for how the campaign organization will interact with other
actors within the electoral arena, as well as a plan for the internal structural coordination
of the campaign. Martin's (I 993, p. 63) study of campaign management techniques
suggests that the political party-campaign coalition is especially important if the campaign
wants to attract highly partisan voters whom the party can easily mobilize and influence.
Poor campaign-party relations can also harm campaigns because many campaigns rely

heavily on the locaL state, or national political parties for fund-raising and grassroots
activities (Wayne, 1992. p. 178)
In conclusion, the literature leaves certain questions to be answered, which are
included as elements of the present study. First, do each of the above examples of
organizational discipline extend in importance to state campaigns, and do campaign
managers play the same role of creating a clear organizational structure and distinct staff
responsibilities in state as in national campaigns? Additionally, what specific techniques
and factors become important to a campaign manager in designing an organizational
structure, delegating responsibilities, building a large volunteer effort, and creating strong
political coalitions? More importantly, this research explores whether such techniques
represent leadership processes/behaviors or merely reflect characteristics of an effective
manager.

Stratel(ic Vision
A third valuable characteristic for campaign organizations is a long-term strategic
v1s1on. Direction is important not only for planning purposes, but common direction
among the staff also creates comfort for staff members and a feeling of cohesion among
the staff through a substantive campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 31). As an example, when
Bush's campaign in 1992 was floundering, the campaign team pushed for bringing former
campaign manager James Baker back into the organization because he was one of the few
people who could help Bush create a vision for his next four years in office, and prevent
him from focusing on his past four years in office (Duffy, 1992, p. 44). The Bush
campaign exuded such a sense of desperation and need for Baker that it is very easy to

conclude that a manager with both a plan for winning and vision or picture for how the
candidate will govern may indeed be priceless to a campaign organization.
Early planning of fundraising and spending strategies appears to be associated with
effective Presidential campaigns. Wayne (I 992, p. 116) argues in his book that within the
structure of presidential contests "having a solid financial base is a strategic imperative."
Campaigns, especially national campaigns, are so costly and contain such a heavy
emphasis on expensive advertising strategies, it may be imperative that managers have the
ability to create long term plans for financial mobilization. The campaign may also be
incomplete without a manager who can facilitate the presentation of the candidate in an
appealing manner to both partisan and independent voters. Furthermore, all of these
different strategies must be set up in phases and be presented as appeals based on timing.
Wayne's (1992, p. 199) book argues that these phases are imperative because there is a
tendency of campaigns to become more highly salient to voters as the election approaches,
and therefore "candidates naturally desire to build momentum as their campaigns
progress." Overall, this discussion emphasizes the possible importance of a strong
campaign manager in balancing the attention/awareness of the campaign organization
between the world external and internal to the campaign organization.
Along with the above emphasis on stages of campaign strategy, it is also important
for the candidate and campaign manager to agree on and consistently present an overall
theme for the campaign. The contrasting Presidential election campaigns of 1996 present
evidence of the value of consistency. Harold Ickes, Clinton's campaign manager, argued
that Clinton would be successful because he presented a distinct message to the American
people and continuously repeated it (Garland, 1995, p. 36). On the other hand,

Newsweek cited one Dole campaign analyst posing the question "What is Dole's
message? One day it's the 15 percent tax cut, the next it's Clinton's character, then it's
back to 'he's a liberal' or 'who do you trust?"' (Alter, 1996, p. 30). The resulting unity
and confidence within the Clinton campaign in contrast to the confusion of the Dole
campaign reveal how important it is for a campaign manager to be aware of and focus on
the need for thematic consistency within the campaign.
Existing discussions of strategy fail to raise several issues that I will address in my
research, including an analysis of both higher order campaign strategies as well as
operational strategies necessary to run the internal campaign organization. An example of
such a higher order strategy would be the Do]e campaign's broad message, "he's a
liberal," in attacking Bill Clinton. The specific execution of that message in advertising or
other attack methods against Bill Clinton would represent an operational strategy.
Through an analysis of these two strategic levels I will characterize, compare, and contrast
the manager's role as leader for both the higher order and operational strategies.· In other
words, does the effective campaign manager focus his leadership skills solely upon internal
organizational strategy, or does she/he balance that behavior with an emphasis on creating
an overarching message, such as "it's the economy stupid"? Additionally, the present
study attempts to identify possible mechanisms used by a campaign manager to influence
strategy on both levels. Finally, since strategy is naturally associated with both the
candidate and the manager positions, the manner in which these individuals resolve
conflicts that may arise over disagreements in strategy requires attention.

Locus ofMana�ement

Managers must not only be wary of processes within the campaign, but they must
also be wary of the candidate. Candidates can become excessively involved in either or
both the administrative, managerial work of the campaign and the direction setting,
leadership work of the campaign. For example, one major problem cited in the losing
campaigns of both the 1988 and 1996 Presidential elections were candidates who
controlled their organization themselves. Co-chair of the Dole campaign, Lyn Nofziger,
criticized the Dole campaign because "there was no organization and nothing went right.
But a lot of that was Dole's fault. He always interferes with his own campaigns"
(Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). Therefore, such criticism may indicate that candidate interference
confuses the locus of control within the campaign, and may also lead to hostility among
campaign leaders. The campaign manager who can communicate well with the candidate
and foresee such difficulties may be able to act as preventative medicine for problems in
this area of campaign management. On the other hand, if the candidate seeks control of
his/her own campaign and chooses a complementary campaign manager, hostility and
conflict may not occur among campaign leaders. However, in the latter case the campaign
may not be as effective because the candidate has assumed the overwhelming job of
running his/her campaign, as well as the responsibilities of traveling, meeting voters, and
media appearances.
Despite a need for a locus of organizational control focused on the campai gn
manager the candidate should not be totally lacking in input. National campaign
consultant, Frank Luntz ( 1988, p. 57), conducted a survey of 68 campaign consultants and
found that 46% believed the candidate should be somewhat involved in campaign strategy,
compared to 15% who argued for little or no involvement. These findings based on the

views of campaign insiders lend credence to the idea that candidates should be involved in
their campaigns, but that they should temper their involvement. In fact, in the 1988
Presidential election campaign Lee Atwater, Bush's campaign manager. argued that the
difference between Bush losing and winning was because "he made some basic strategy
calls in this race that we might have made differently" (Runkel, 1989, p. 91 ). Clearly,
most experts in campaign management analysis would argue for a balance of control
between the candidate and campaign manager as the optimal strategy for an effective
political campaign.
Balance may also be an important focus in successful relationships between
consultants and campaign managers. Martin's (I 993, p. 101) study of campaign
organizations defined the most effective role of campaign consultants as advisers
providing specialized assistance in focused areas on behalf of the candidate. However,
sometimes the role clarity of the two positions can become intermingled and internal strife
based on control conflicts between these two parties can result. Luntz (1988, p. 64)
argues that some consultants would even go as far as to purposely undermine the power
of the manager, exploiting the sometimes harsh relationship between the candidate and
manager. Such conflict among leaders within a campaign can be destructive and draining
of productive energy. One of the goals of the present study is to characterize preventative
measures that the manager may take in order to halt such conflict.
The discussion above leaves a major question unanswered in regard to who should
have responsibility within a campaign to maintain a balance of control over strategy and
management between the candidate and other campaign staff. I would hypothesize that
the central role of the campaign manager as the chief administrative officer would lend

credence to the position of the manager as the best locus for this responsibility, since he or
she is responsible for the inner structural coordination of the campaign. Additionally, the
discussion above fails to isolate leadership techniques that a campaign manager may use to
maintain a balance of campaign control between the candidate and the manager or to
prevent campaign control conflicts. However, before addressing this issue, I must
examine whether the conflicts described above occur as often on the level of state
campaigns, the subject of my study. In particular I am interested in determining if the
ability to manage conflicts among campaign staff, including the candidate, is a highly
regarded leadership trait for campaign managers. In the end, this study hopes to reveal the
impact of locus of control conflicts on the ability of the campaign manager, or for that
matter, the candidate, to enact positive and effective leadership skills.
In conclusion, the four categories or themes of effective campaigns described
above provide good starting points for probing the character of campaign managers as
leaders. The literature pretty consistently shows that at least teamwork, structural
coordination, vision, and locus of control are important for effective campaign
organizations and tend to be responsibilities associated with the campaign manager.
However, even though the literature associates these characteristics with the campaign
manager, this does not mean that the campaign manager, at the state level, does or should
be involved in these functions and activities. Therefore, in this study I attempt to
determine the level of influence the campaign manager tends to display within state
campaigns. the leadership techniques managers in these types of campaigns use to perform
their duties, and the sort ofleadership framework that best describes the role of the
campaign manager as a leader within the campaign organization.

Leadership Literature Review
The lack of any previous theoretical framework for understanding campaign
managers and their roles in political campaigns led me to create a leadership theory-based
framework for the study of campaign managers. In other words, the lack of scholarly
information on campaign managers and leadership led me to create an exploratory
framework so I could study campaign managers through the lens of leadership. Therefore.
in this section I isolate various concepts from the realm of the leadership literature and
indicate the relevancy and importance of these concepts to my project. Among other
reasons, I chose the following leadership concepts because they best test what I believe to
be imperative behaviors for a leader. In addition, the following theories are integral within
the discipline of leadership to describe how leaders use power, communicate and exchange
information with followers. and inspire followers. I also chose the following theories
because many of the behaviors described within the theories. such as communicating and
motivating, are associated frequently with campaign managers in the campaign literature.
Since these behaviors are integral to effective leadership, I believe that viewing campaign
manager behaviors in light of these leadership theories will effectively explore their role as
leaders, managers, or both.

Social Exchange Theory
Within any campaign organization there are going to be relationships among the
members of that organization, be they leader-follower relationships. co-follower
relationships, or co-leader relationships. One leadership theory which applies the concept
of transactions within relationships and the resulting influence and status gained from
those transactions is Social Exchange Theory (Yuki, 1994, p. 210). The basis of Social

Exchange Theory is that leaders within an organization contribute to a group through their
" ... control over scarce resources, access to vital information, or skill in dealing with
critical task problems" (Yuki, 1994, p. 2 JO). The result of such a relationship is that when
a leader or follower positively uses the resources he or she controls for the betterment of
the group, he or she gains idiosyncratic credits or trust with the group, thereby increasing
that individual's level of influence.
Along with describing Social Exchange Theory, the literature I looked at revealed
a number ofresearch findings regarding Social Exchange Theory. First, Yuki's (1994, p.
210) research found that leaders are expected to be innovators in their work and that their
resulting success or failure with regard to innovation correlates strongly with a
complementary increase or decrease in the level of influence given to the leader by the
group. In other words, status seems to be ascribed to the leader by his or her followers
based on what the leader gives to the group, as a whole. Other research shows that Social
Exchange Theory can be used to describe why members join groups. For instance,
Newcomb (l 960) conducted a study of college men living together in a dormitory in
which he found that people join groups because of the similarity in values between the
individual joining and the group itself, an exchange in values between the two entities
(Forsyth, 1990, p. 63). This finding may very well extend to campaign organizations
because it may explain why campaign staff and volunteers join and leave campaigns. I
hypothesize that campaign leaders, including the campaign manager, who do not identify
with and even criticize the staff and volunteer's political values can cause attrition of those
campaign participants.

A sub-area of Social Exchange Theory of possible importance to this study is
Vertical Dyad Linkage Theory. This theory argues that leaders develop special in-group
relationships with certain members of a group and that mutual influence between the two
parties results (Yuki, 1994, p. 238). The rest of the members of a group have an out
group relationship with the leader, where the leader primarily uses downward coercion
and distributes rewards to gain followers' compliance (Yuki. 1994, p. 238). With regard
to my study, important research findings by Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, and Haga (1976)
show that an individual's ability to have an in-group relationship with his/her followers
relies on the ability of that leader to have positive in-group relationships with his/her
leaders. In other words, leaders who tend to use coercion and rewards to gain their
followers' compliance also tend to be coerced or rewarded by their own leaders. The
question in relation to my study is whether a correlation exists between the nature of the
relationships between the campaign manager and lower campaign staff, and the nature of
the relationship between the campaign manager and the candidate.
In light of past research and the emphasis of the current study on an appointed
leader ( campaign manager), it is important to note differences between the social exchange
processes of elected versus appointed leaders. Past research shows elected leaders tend to
be more dependent on subordinate evaluation, have higher expectations from their
followers, and are more vulnerable to rejection by followers than are appointed leaders
(Yuki, 1994, p. 210-211 ). Despite such differences between appointed and elected
leaders, there is reason to believe that social exchanges are very important between the
campaign manager and other staff members. Extrapolating from the political campaign
literature discussed above, social exchange is important in describing the role of the

campaign manager because of his/her control over information and communication
networks, and his/her subsequent ability to empower and influence others within the
organization through such control. Using the Dole campaign as an example, we find that
Scott Reed, Dole's campaign manager, would not open up strategic discussions to other
members of the campaign staff, thereby hoarding informational resources. As a result,
followers. such as the media consultants, lost trust in Scott Reed and left the organization
because Reed cut off the informational exchange (Barnes, 1996, p. 1968). Thus, in my
study I attempt to describe exchange relationships between campaign managers and other
staff, and to discover the potential impact of such exchange relationships on the overall
effectiveness of the organization. Furthermore, I try to isolate how these exchanges
impact the gain or loss of status and trust for the campaign manager and perceptions of
his/her leadership role.

Bases of Power
Sources of power for campaign managers may also be helpful in describing the role
of the campaign manager as a leader. One categorization of power specifically cited in the
leadership literature is French and Raven's (Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, 1995, p. 340345) five power bases: Expert power or the power of having information, referent power
or power gained from personal respect and admiration of a leader, legitimate power or
power based on one's formal position, and reward and coercive power or the respective
abilities of a leader to influence others positively or negatively based on his/her control of
resources. Use of this theory is not duplicative of Social Exchange Theory because past
research shows Social Exchange Theory to be most applicable and narrowly focused on
expert power. Therefore, use of French and Raven's model of power in this study allows

for the categorization of the campaign manager's use of other power bases besides expert
power. Additionally, consideration of power bases allows me to examine the effects of
various forms of power on campaign managers, beyond their effect on levels of trust
ascribed to leaders under Social Exchange Theory.
Closely related to power bases is the idea of influence tactics. The difference
between the two concepts is that" ... power is the capacity or potential to influence
others, [while] influence tactics are the actual behaviors used by an agent to change the
attitudes, opinions, or behaviors of a target person" (Wren, 1995, p. 348). In essence,
influence tactics are the operational side of power bases. A leader who merely examines
his/her power bases only comes to an understanding of the type of authority of his/her
position, whereas a leader who examines his/her influence tactics better understands why
certain tactics lead to certain outcomes (Wren, 1995, p. 350). The various influence
techniques include among others the following: Rational persuasion, or the use oflogical
arguments, inspirational appeals, or proposals made to encourage enthusiasm,
consultation, or when followers participate in planning an activity, and pressure tactics, or
threats (Wren, 1995, p. 348-349). In summary, a study of power bases may lead to an
understanding of how a leader's position influences the leadership behaviors used, while a
study of influence techniques may allow one to better understand the impacts of such
leadership behaviors.
As a group, the research on and application of power base theory reveals a bias
within the theory. For example, Yuki's (1994, p. 208) study exploring French and
Raven's power bases revealed that less socially desirable forms of power such as coercion
may not be reported in relation to leader effectiveness in research because satisfied

subordinates tend to attribute the more socially desirable referent power to the leader than
unsatisfied subordinates. In contrast, Warren ( 1968) "... found that expert, referent, and
legitimate power were correlated positively with attitudinal commitment by subordinates,
whereas reward and coercive power were correlated with behavioral compliance" (Yuki,
1994, p. 208-209). This contrast may indicate that generalizations about a leader's
effectiveness and use of power bases may vary greatly depending on whether one defines
effectiveness according to subordinate satisfaction, commitment, or compliance.
By itself, the concept of power bases would probably be too prescriptive for
application to this study. While campaign managers may want to use some of the methods
described in the conclusion of this paper for influencing their leaders, co-leaders, and
followers, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore and describe the power bases
used by campaign managers and the leadership influence tactics they use to assert these
power bases. Additionally, some of French and Raven's categories may not be applicable
to campaign managers. For example, I would conjecture that the campaign manager is
unable to use coercive power and punishment on volunteer members of an organization
because of the nature of the leader-follower relations in that environment. Campaign
organizations are unique because they are temporary and contain members whose motives
may differ from those joining other organizations. Many organizations have members who
work for them for pay or self-advancement, but volunteers in a political campaign may be
working for that organization solely for altruistic reasons. I hope to generalize some
leadership techniques used by campaign managers within organizations to assert power,
the type of power they are most likely to assert, and the impact of the uniqueness of the
organization on their potential power bases.

Visionary Leadership
The uniqueness of the political campaign organization and the position of
campaign manager provide an excellent opportunity from which to apply the principles of
visionary leadership. One view of visionary leadership comes from Marshall Sashkin
{1995, p. 403) who identifies three parts of visionary leadership: Creating a future image
for the organization, formulating an organizational philosophy that reflects that image and
practicing that philosophy, and leaders' actions in personal relationships with other
members of the organization to support that vision. In interpreting these three stages, I
would conjecture that visionary leadership involves bringing a group from their current
status closer to an ideal status, or bridging the gap between current reality and
expectations. In fact, Breckhard and Pritchard {1995, p. 398) argue that during periods of
change, the successful leader identifies and creates a plan for what the organization must
do to meet the demands of change. For example, the leader determines if the organization
needs to expand its employee base to meet increased consumer demand, and where and
how to conduct such an expansion. Bennis (1995, p. 378) concurs with this argument and
observes that successful leaders possess "the capacity to create and communicate a
compelling vision of a desired state of affairs ... " To generalize, these scholars seem to
argue that it is important for a successful leader to communicate his/her vision to followers
and gain followers' acceptance of that vision and the constant expansion of that vision.
Hence, while goals specifically associated with the vision may be achieved, the vision
becomes never-ending, and is constantly in a state of growth and change.
Past research also reveals various techniques leaders can use in practicing visionary
leadership. In a study of twelve CEOs, Tichy and Devanna ( 1986, p. 362) found that

leaders with high self-esteem and a common purpose with their followers tended to be
characterized as visionary leaders. Bennis and Nanus (1995, p. 364) support this
conclusion in their study of corporate and public sector organizational leaders finding that
many times the visions leaders espoused came from followers within the organization and
as a result of open communication networks. Since managers may be thought of as chief
administrative officers for campaigns, one of the goals of my research is to determine if
some of the same leadership techniques used by CEOs and organizational leaders are also
used by campaign leaders in developing and articulating their visions for campaign
organizations.
Visionary leadership is important in this research because I believe that there may
be two different visions within a political campaign. The campaign manager may have a
vision for the organization, while the candidate may have a vision for the office and region
in which he or she is running. Then again the campaign manager may not even have a
leadership vision, and may therefore be characterized as more of a manager than a leader.
Despite the fact that past visionary leadership research has focused on organizations that
have long term visions, and the campaign organization has a short term focus, the theory
still has strong implications for this study. I would hypothesize that a campaign
organization needs a visionary leader or someone who can communicate and gain
commitment from staff for a common overarching campaign direction. Without this I
believe that the campaign becomes inefficient and ineffective as staff members begin to
pursue different goals that at best do not complement each other and at worst are
diametrically opposed to one another. Additionally, visionary leadership tends to
emphasize concepts that are also important to an effective campaign organization. Similar

to the characteristics of an effective campaign organization, Sashkin ( 1995, p. 403) argues
that leaders who effectively use visionary leadership need to facilitate communication and
listening to others, consistency and trustworthiness, and self-respect and respect for
others. Exploring these similarities, understanding the relationship between the respective
visions of managers and candidates, and determining the impact of the short term nature of
the campaign organization on visionary leadership are major focal points of the present
study.

Tran.iforminK Leadership
The final leadership approach that is relevant to this paper is the idea of
transforming leadership. James MacGregor Burns (1978, p. 19-20) defines transfonning
leadership as leaders and followers mutually facilitating each other to higher levels of
moral motivation. By moral motivation Burns means mutual appeals by both actors
towards values such as liberty.justice, and equality (Yuki, 1994, p. 351). Bass (1985. p.
351} built upon Burns' framework with his own theory of transformational leadership, in
which the leader motivates followers by making them aware of the value of the task at
hand, the importance of the organization's needs over the followers' self-interest, and the
followers' higher-order needs. Implicitly, Bass' research focused more narrowly on the
direction of influence from leader to follower, as opposed to Bums' research on the
mutual influence between the two.
Despite differences between Bass and Burns regarding transformational leadership,
both agree on the definition of another form of leadership. transactional leadership. Both
agree that this kind of leadership represents a sort of social exchange relationship
characterized by an exchange of rewards for compliance, or leaders and followers

exchanging valued resources, but having no long term mutual purpose that binds them
(Yuki, 1994, p. 352,; Burns, 1978, p. 19-20). Of possibly greater importance to this
study, a number of scholarly studies show that the most effective type ofleadership
behavior is that which is comprised of a balance of transformational and transactional
behaviors (Yuki, 1994, p. 352, 354).
In brief, transforming leadership is important for this project because it draws
attention to what binds members of the campaign organization together. It is equally
important to take note of transformational leadership and transactional leadership because
they may also be important in understanding the leadership versus management roles of
campaign managers, and in determining what makes their leadership or management
effective. In addition, by examining transforming leadership I hope to find what, if any
role the manager plays in facilitating the grO\vth of the moral values of volunteers.
Furthermore, I am interested in determining if a manager can be a transforming leader
within the organization or if that undermines the role that the candidate must play. Finally,
if the manager is a transforming leader I would like to isolate the moral values, such as
liberty within Burns' framework, that bind the organization and members to the manager
in this exchange relationship. However, if the manager is either solely a transactional
leader or both a transactional leader and a transforming leader, 1 would also like to isolate
the concrete resources that are being exchanged between the campaign manager and the
followers. For example, I hope to determine whether or not the volunteers work for the
manager in exchange for his or her expertise in getting the candidate elected.
In conclusion, although not exhaustive, the four approaches to understanding
leadership discussed above appear to be those that are most applicable to the study of

campaign managers and leadership. In particular, I will use the leadership concepts to
explain the campaign manager's role as a leader within the framework of the eight
categories of campaign effectiveness isolated in the campaign literature. I believe that the
same leader-follower behaviors described by the leadership literature can also be used to
describe the campaign manager's behaviors in relating to the candidate and other staff
members. Therefore, under the guidance of the leadership concepts above I will create a
theoretical framework depicting the nature of the campaign manager as a leader, manager,
or a combination of both.
Methodolo�
The purpose of my project is to create a possible theoretical framework for
understanding campaign managers and leadership, and therefore the purpose is
exploratory in nature. Exploratory research is valuable for a project such as mine because
it " ... assumes the value of context and setting, and searches for a deeper understanding
of the participants' lived experiences of the phenomenon" (Marshall, 1995, p. 39). Along
these lines, the data I have used in developing my framework was derived from the
experiences of participants within campaign organizations and their perceptions of their
campaign managers.
A subordinate purpose of my project is to explore previously identified themes that
are common within effective and ineffective campaign organizations in a context, which
has yet to be studied. As noted earlier, most studies of campaigns in the past have focused
on Presidential campaigns, and neglected research on local or state campaigns, opening
the question of whether generalizations from Presidential campaigns can be applied on a
more localized level. Therefore, 1 conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of

participants involved in four gubernatorial campaigns within the state of Virginia. In order
to prevent partisan bias and to obtain data that are more generalizable, I interviewed
members of two Democratic campaigns, the Mary Sue Terry and Don Beyer campaigns,
and members of two Republican campaigns, the George Allen and the James Gilmore
campaigns.

Sample
Within the campaigns noted above I sampled a variety of high and low level
campaign staff based upon the availability and accessibility of those individuals and their
willingness and ability to give me information about their respective campaign managers.
This sample was meant to be diverse and representative of a broad range of views within
campaign organizations, thus providing a reliable base for generalizations. In order to
maintain confidentiality, participants in the samples are not directly quoted, only listed in
the bibliography section of this paper, and their responses have only been used to identify
thematic similarities and dissimilarities in their responses.

Interviews
I used telephone and face-to-face interviews to collect data because they allowed
me to gain in-depth insight into participants' perspectives on events within the respective
campaign organizations. However, I must note that because my questions sought to
obtain the perceptions of participants and because I have summarized the respondents
answers according to my own perceptions, question and interviewer bias may be a source
of error that limits the results of this study. Furthermore, these interviews focused upon
an organization, the campaign, that can be secretive and personal at times, so some
information may have been withheld from me (Marshall, 1995, p.380-81 ). My only

method for preventing the withholding of jnformation was to guarantee respondents that
their names would not be directly associated with any quoted material in my paper.

Interview Schedule
More specifically, I created a moderately structured interview schedule designed to
explore the twelve issues outlined in the literature review section of my project under the
umbrella of leadership (see Appendix I). These questions have been pre-tested with a
sample of individuals to increase the clarity of the instrument, and have been" ...
examined for bias, sequence, clarity, and face validity" (Marshall, 1995, p. 96). The
twelve concepts which I chose to focus upon included: teamwork/organizational
communication, organizational structure, strategic vision, locus of management, mutual
respect and trust, grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of
experience, level of energy, focus on opposition research, control for campaign leaks, and
confidence level. Each of the primary interview questions was open-ended so that
respondents would not be influenced by any interviewer expectations. Furthermore, each
of the interview questions was designed to test a specific concept or two from the list
above.
Jn order to better understand the structure of my interviews, I have outlined below
the rationale underlying the interview questions. First, 1 divided my questions into four
subject areas, the respondent, the campaign manager's responsibilities, the overall
effectiveness of the organization, and the role of the campaign manager as a leader. The
question area regarding the respondent focused upon his or her role within the formal
structure, and perception of informational flow within the organization and that
individual's feelings about positive and negative aspects of the campaign. My objective

was to elicit responses from the individual that characterized the dyadic relationship
between the individual and the campaign manager. It was hoped that these questio_ns
wou)d reveal information regarding the leader-follower exchanges between the individual
and the campaign manager, and the "power bases" or "influence tactics" used by the
campaign manager. Furthermore. the questions regarding the positive or negative
characteristics of the campaign were intended to reveal respondent perceptions regarding
the locus of responsibility for such characteristics within the organizational hierarchy.
The second area of questions focused directly upon the campaign manager as a
leader. These questions allowed me to better characterize whether the campaign manager
was perceived of as a leader and, if so, the type of leadership behaviors the campaign
manager displayed. Other areas of inquiry, such as the details of scheduling and advance
work in contrast to the broader strategic vision of the campaign, were designed to obtain
information that would allow me to characterize the leadership or management status of
the campaign manager.
The third area of questions focused on the broader context of the organization.
These questions sought to obtain information regarding the level of effectiveness of the
campaign as perceived by the respondents. Organizational culture, vision, and grassroots
empowerment were the foci of these questions. Among other things, I hoped that
responses to these questions would allow me to explain and outline the leadership
techniques and role of the campaign manager as a leader in cultivating an effective
organizational culture, vision, and grassroots effort for the campaign organization.
The final two questions were summary questions meant to gamer a conclusion
from the respondent regarding the leadership/management role of the campaign manager,

and why the respondent drew such a conclusion about that role. A comparison of the
consistency of these responses to the respondents' earlier statements enabled me to
determine whether the interpretations I made from those earlier statements accurately
reflected the beliefs of that respondent. Consequently, if the respondent's earlier
statements diverged from his/her final conclusion, then my interpretations and
generalizations may have been inaccurate, or the respondent may have misunderstood my
questions or what occurred in his/her campaign.
A common theme throughout all of the interview questions was that each question
sought to elicit a response that revealed the respondents' perceived locus of control with
regard to the concept being measured. It is hoped that each question provided an
opportunity for the respondent to identify the locus of leadership within the campaign
organization, possibly the campaign manager. Furthermore, the interview questions called
for extensive respondent descriptions of campaign characteristics allowing them to
possibly identify leadership behaviors used by senior campaign staff to influence such
characteristics_ Though a better data collection instrument may have existed for this
study, I used this instrument because it distinctly isolated the concepts I desired to study,
and produced data from which I could draw generalizations.
My analysis of the responses to my research interviews is twofold in nature. Each
question was meant to elicit a response from the interviewee through which I hoped to
discern patterns of behavior within the organization, especially with reference to the
campaign manager. Therefore, I sought internal consistency among responses from a
single respondent to characterize the leadership behavior of the campaign manager, and
comparative consensus among respondents to increase the validity of these

characterizations. Disagreements on patterns of behavior or multiple patterns
characterized across respondents may indicate the lack of validity behind that concept and
its use in studying the leadership of campaign managers, or they may be accounted for by
extraneous factors that I am attempting to isolate within this study. Conversely,
agreements among respondents may indicate valid concepts that may be useful for the
further study of campaign managers' leadership behaviors; however, care was taken not to
over-generalize from my data, since socially desirable responses may have accounted for
agreement among respondents.
The second part of the analysis focused on responses in terms of the general
leadership concepts outlined in the literature review. For example, if many respondents
emphasized the negativity of the campaign manager for not controlling the campaign, I
examined the context of their responses. Consideration of such contexts helped reveal
whether the campaign manager's actions or lack of action might best be understood
through the lens of poor transformational leadership, an inability to capitalize on his or her
power bases, or another leadership concept.
In conclusion, this project aimed to create a theoretical framework for
understanding the leadership behavior of campaign managers. More specifically, I am
attempted to isolate various behaviors that highlight effective leadership on the part of
campaign managers, and subsequently to explain these behaviors within the penumbra of
the concepts of power bases, transformational leadership, Social Exchange Theory, and
visionary leadership.
Data Results

The following data for this research paper were acquired through a series of26
interviews with members of the four Virginia gubernatorial campaigns outlined above (See
Appendix III). In presenting results, the respondents will not be directly quoted and the
campaigns will be identified by the numbers 1 through 4 to add an element of anonymity
to the participants in this research. The data include interviews with both senior staff and
lower level staff, as well as interviews with three out of the four campaign managers and
three out of four of the candidates in the four election campaigns. The campaign manager,
candidate, and other staff members not interviewed were either not accessible, refused to
be interviewed, or no longer lived in this area. Presentation of the results is structured
according to major subject areas included in my interview schedule.

Information Flow and Structure
The first subject area of questions focused on the respondent's perceptions
regarding the campaign organization. As part of this section respondents were asked to
characterize the informational flow or communicational structure of the campaign
organization. A common theme throughout each campaign organization was weekly or
monthly staff meetings involving the senior staff Though each campaign had different
titles for the senior staff and included different numbers of people in their senior staff, a
general common picture of the composition of the senior staffbecame apparent. In each
of the four campaigns respondents emphasized that the candidate, campaign manager,
fundraising director, and a press secretary or media consultant were the members of the
senior staff. Campaigns two, three, and four also included strategic consultants, media
consultants, and polling staff, in their senior staff structure.

It may be important to note one difference emphasized by members of campaign
one. Campaign one was unique because this campaign organization also held staff
meetings for each department within the campaign organization, giving an opportunity for
input from lower level staff into the decision making process. For example. the
department head in charge of field coordination, or volunteer mobilization, would have
weekly conference calls with field representatives in various areas of the state.
A series of questions also focused on determining if the campaign manager was
integral in facilitating communication and the information flow within the campaign
organization. The results show that, indeed, the campaign manager was mentioned
extensively as both a source of and recipient of infonnation. However, the results also
show that respondents in all four campaigns were just as likely to mention either the
candidate or the various department heads as their primary sources of infonnation or
targets of the messages they sent. Many respondents in campaign one communicated
directly with the candidate because the candidate was accessible and because they wanted
to bypass the campaign manager. They disagreed with the campaign manager's
management style and ideas, and also felt like they were 'left out of the loop' in the
decision making process. Campaign three respondents pointed out the importance of the
various department heads in the communication flow because they saw the campaign as
very loosely organized. There was a lack of strict control from above over how
information would travel throughout the organization. Many respondents understood that
they had a job, understood the duties of that job, and did that job with little or no
supervision. Therefore, it was up to each individual to seek out information that he or she

needed, and the department heads, the only clear hierarchical positions in the campaign,
became targets for giving and receiving information.
Respondents were also asked to determine if the information flow was generally
accurate, timely, and adequate for them to do their jobs. Overwhelmingly, three out of
four of the campaigns characterized their respective information flows as accurate. A
common response was that staff members could always accurately back up internal polling
results done by the respective campaigns with the media polls published

in newspapers.

Campaign four respondents, on the other hand, characterized their informational flow as
only somewhat accurate and they were highly critical of the poll interpretations of the
consultants. They found interpretations of polling results to give a false sense of security
on certain issues, leading to inaction by the candidate or campaign on issues that turned
out to be imperative for the campaign to address.
With regard to timeliness of messages, by a two-to-one margin most respondents
believed the campaign organization to "always" be timely with information versus only
"sometimes" timely with infonnation. However, all of the respondents who criticized the
timeliness of information in their respective organizations attributed the problem to the
inherent nature of campaigns. For example, respondents would state that candidate A
would attack candidate B on an issue on Monday morning, and by that afternoon
candidate B would need to have his team prepare a defensive response and counterattack.
Every respondent from all of the campaigns stated that the information that the
respondent received was always adequate for that person to do his or her job.
Furthermore, some respondents commented that if they ever needed more information

they could always approach the candidate or another informational resource for such
information.
When asked about the formal hierarchy of the respective campaigns, respondents
from each campaign gave similar descriptions with only minor deviations. Respondents
from campaigns one and three described a structure with the candidate at the top of the
organizational chart followed by the campaign manager and consultants. who oversaw the
department heads (See Appendix II). Campaigns two and four only differed in that they
placed the campaign manager and consultants at the same level beneath the candidate with
all of the department heads (See Appendix II). However, campaigns one and four did
both tend to make use of a '"kitchen cabinet" comprised of advisers. or close, personal
friends of the candidate. These people were not hired by the organization and their role
was to give outside advice on broad strategic decisions. According to respondents. the
primary reason for the chosen structures was tradition. The senior staff who selected the
structure tended to be experienced in political campaigns and had found based on past
experience that these respective structures provided the best means of coordination and
tended to be associated with winning campaigns.
Perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the structure varied somewhat
across the campaign organizations, but there were some overall similarities. All of the
campaigns emphasized the importance of autonomy and openness of communication
within the formal hierarchy. Generally speaking. respondents considered autonomy to be
the willingness of campaign leaders to allow staff members to be self-directed. Senior
staff members delegated responsibility to and empowered lower staff members by allowing
lower staff members to make decisions on their own. such as how each member would

play a role in implementing the campaign strategy. With regard to open communication,
respondents indicated that senior staff members were always willing to take their advice
on issues and listen to their concerns. One respondent in campaign three related a story of
how that individual almost used an idea by the candidate's driver as an idea for a campaign
commercial. Even in campaign one, where respondents felt "out of the loop," some
emphasized how the candidate would call individuals directly for advice on certain
campaign ideas or to solicit information.
Oddly enough, even among the losing campaigns, the most common answer to the
question about structural weaknesses was that "there were none." However, each
campaign did have its detractors, and among all of the campaigns the single greatest
structural flaw was the lack of cohesiveness or teamwork within the organization. The
same autonomy claimed as a strength above was also likely to be claimed as a weakness.
It is important to note that each campaign had cohesiveness problems in different areas
and for different reasons. Campaign three, the campaign described as loosely organized,
tended to encourage workers to act independently of each other, and as a consequence at
times they would pursue opposite directions, sometimes to the detriment of the campaign.
In a similar, but more narrowly defined situation, campaign number four had difficulties
with consultants and their ability to work with the rest of the campaign staff. Respondents
from campaign four complained that consultants only paid attention to their poll numbers,
focused too much on national trends in politics, and failed to fully understand the
character of the Virginia voter.

General Campaign Characteristics

The next section of questions focused on isolating common strengths and
weaknesses across the four campaigns. The overwhelming response was that the greatest
strength of the campaigns was the people involved. The reasons for giving this answer
differed widely across the campaigns, but some descriptions were more popular.
Respondents thought very highly of the level of enthusiasm of the people involved in all of
the campaigns. In campaign one, respondents stated the importance of a highly motivated
group of staff members when the campaign hits a slump. This can help the group unite
under pressure creating cohesiveness among staff members, another frequently noted
positive characteristic of the campaigns. Similarly, campaigns one and three both created
an atmosphere void of backbiting. Staff members united behind the candidate, believed in
the principles of the candidate, and put aside their petty differences. In campaign one, one
respondent explained how the belief in the candidate was so important to volunteers that
this individual was able to mobilize volunteers and gain their commitment to the campaign,
despite a lack of campaign literature, yard signs, and other rallying points for energy.
Responsibility for creating and maintaining energy, cohesion, and high
performance standards among the staff and volunteers was attributed to the candidate in
every campaign except campaign three, where respondents failed to identify a source of
responsibility. Whether the candidate won or lost, the respective respondents would never
fail to tell me a story about how fans, volunteers. and supporters would flock to their
respective candidate whenever he or she came to town. Most respondents credited and
attributed their candidates with charisma, a contagious vision. and an image of having
strong and consistent political and moral principles.

Two positive characteristics were identified by many respondents: Grassroots
support for the candidate and ample money to spend on the campaign. Grassroots support
was considered important because it allowed respondents to "feel" the energy of the
voting public for their candidate and increased their motivation and energy in return.
Money increased the confidence of the respondents because the more money the campaign
had the more it could spend on television ads, bumper stickers. and yard signs, thereby
increasing the visibility of the campaign.
Negative characteristics emphasized by the respondents primarily focused on three
areas including the media, field work, and monetary concerns. Campaigns two and four
both had many problems with the media attacking their respective candidates.
Respondents from both of these campaigns complained that the media in various parts of
the state were highly critical of their respective campaigns and candidates, and that the
media consultants and press secretary for the campaigns were unable to diffuse these
attacks. Campaigns one, three, and four all had some difficulty with field work.
Campaign one respondents argued that their campaign manager emphasized media
coverage too much at the expense of the grassroots or field effort. Campaign three
respondents complained that the candidate neglected parts of the state, alienating certain
voting sectors, and lowering the morale of the grassroots effort. Finally, money was a
difficulty in campaign one and two, but for different reasons. Almost everyone respondent
explained that campaign two could not raise enough money to put the candidate up in
hotels when that individual was on the road. This decreased staff morale and hence had a
negative effect on the energy level of the staff. Campaign one, on the other hand. had
enough money, but respondents tended to believe that the money was mismanaged. As

stated above, many believed the campaign did not spend enough money on field efforts
and did not target important voting populations as much as was necessary.

Confidence Level
In general, the respondents of all of the campaigns except number four expressed
confidence in the campaign and its potential for success throughout the campaign season.
Furthermore, respondents in all four of the campaigns cited polls as a major reason for
their confidence or lack thereof Respondents said that polls showed how much the voting
public either identified with a specific candidate or issue, raising campaign staff morale.
Respondents also cited the candidate as a major reason for their leve] of confidence.
Returning to an example above, respondents said they saw how crowds reacted to meeting
their respective candidates, and how the crowds 'loved' or 'adored' their particular
candidate. The voters' overwhelming sense of identification with the candidate spread
within the organization, so much so that respondents in campaign two even described the
campaign atmosphere as a "family" environment with family members building the
confidence of other family members.
Respondents stated that the level of cohesiveness did have an effect on the
confidence level within the campaign. Respondents from every campaign except number
two expressed the negative side of decreased cohesiveness among the staff Respondents
from campaign four cited that the consultants and those advocating the use of television,
the media, and polls became pitted against those advocating the use of volunteers and field
work as the direction for the campaign. Consequently, two different camps arose with
different strategic directions for the campaign, and the ensuing confusion about direction
was cited as lowering the morale of the campaign staff In contrast, respondents from

campaign two described their organization as comprised of a tightly knit group of
confident senior campaign officials, finance director, campaign manager, media person,
and the candidate. These respondents stated that the senior team served as a role model
for the rest of the organization. Hence, other staff members, seeking to identify with these
leaders, would internalize and express the positive, consistent confidence of the senior
staff
Respondents from the four campaigns split in their judgement on the effect of
money on the confidence level of staff members. Campaigns two and four believed that
money had no effect on the confidence level. Many respondents from campaign two
redirected my attention to their comments about the level of voter support as the major
source ofincreased confidence within the campaign, because in the end they believed
money did not buy votes. Campaigns one and three, on the other hand, believed that the
more money spent, the more name and face recognition garnered for the candidate, and
the better the chance of getting votes. Respondents from campaign three spoke ·of the
sense of increased faith they felt when they would drive around certain areas of Virginia,
and evel)Where they looked they saw their candidate's name or their candidate's picture.

Campaiw, Manager's Role
This set of questions revealed different pictures of the respective roles of the
campaign manager within the four campaigns, but also some common similarities among
them, as well. The only aspect common to all four campaigns, according to respondents,
was that the respective campaign managers were all involved in the coordination or day
to-day work of the campaign in some capacity. For every campaign this meant making
sure a press meeting did not occur at the same time as a fundraising event, or that two

different department heads were not duplicating each other's work. For campaign three it
meant making sure that if the press people were supposed to send out a press release in
two days, that this in fact did occur. For campaign four it meant administrative tasks such
as hiring competent people or making sure that regional offices throughout Virginia were
staffed with volunteers.
Respondents in campaigns one, two, and three also indicated that the role of the
campaign manager was to oversee how money was spent, and not necessarily to see how
it was raised. The manager in campaign two was always concerned about whether too
much money had been spent on literature endorsing the candidate, while the campaign
manager in campaign three was always worried about where in Virginia the campaign's
money should be spent, Richmond versus Northern Virginia.
Respondents in campaigns two, three, and four also emphasized the role of the
candidate in resolving conflicts within the organization. Respondents in campaign three
described instances where a fight occurred among staff members over blaming someone
for spending too much on literature or ads. Often the manager would step in and take
responsibility for the action alleviating the stress of the situation.
Across the campaigns respondents had different images of the overall role of the
campaign manager in their organization. Campaign one respondents classified their
manager as the person who contacted consultants, aided in crafting messages to be
communicated to the voters, and made strategic decisions, such as how ads would be
created and how money would be spent. Campaign two and three respondents viewed
their manager as involved in both the broader strategic vision for how the election could
be won and in the daily activity of checking on people to make sure jobs were

accomplished and not duplicated by five different people. Campaign three respondents
state that their manager would be just as likely to nail campaign signs to telephone poles,
as to craft the negative ad against the opponent for the next commercial. Finally,
respondents in campaign four portrayed their manager as the most administrative manager
of all four. These respondents gave all of the credit for direction and strategy of the
campaign to the consultants, and viewed the manager as merely implementing their
decisions. In other words, the consultants would say we are going to go negative and
create three negative television ads. and the manager would make sure that a time would
be set up to shoot the ad, that the candidate got involved, and that the necessary staffed
showed up to the ad shoot.
With regard to the relationship between the campaign manager and candidate, the
results show that within campaigns two and three this relationship was one of mutual faith
and trust in each other. Additionally, most of the respondents in these respective
campaigns believed that because the candidate and campaign manager had worked
together in the past, they were able to develop and maintain this sort of relationship. All
of the candidates had run for office before this election with some of the current campaign
managers working on those campaigns. Consequently. respondents stated that the
relationships between at least some of the campaign managers and candidates resulted
from the trust built up during those past elections. Furthermore, this trust served as a
model of inspiration for similar relationships among the rest of the staff who sought to
identify with the candidate and campaign manager.
Respondents from campaigns one and four viewed their respective candidate
campaign manager relationships as being based on conflict over strategic direction.

Respondents cited that the two leaders would argue about whether to focus on television
or newspaper advertisements or whether to focus campaign activities in Richmond or
Northern Virginia. The reasons for these relationship problems varied. In one case the
candidate was seen as stubborn and unwilling to listen to the campaign manager's views�
in other case the principles of how to win differed between the two leaders thereby
resulting in constant and ongoing disputes.
Respondents in the four campaigns also commented on the level of the campaign
manager's involvement in details within the campaign. i.e. the logistics of traveling and the
precise timing of scheduled events. Respondents in all of the campaigns split pretty evenly
over whether or not they believed their campaign manager was a "micro-manager". For
instance. some respondents in campaign three felt that the campaign manager "looked
over their backs" a little too often to see if they were doing their work. However, other
respondents in campaign one explained that the manager did a good job in keeping track
of how the money was spent. so as to prevent waste within the campaign.
Respondents were also asked to describe the level of involvement of their
respective campaign managers in creating the strategic vision of the campaign. Responses
indicated that the managers of campaigns one and three were both heavily involved in
determining how the organization would win the race. However, respondents in
campaigns two and four described the creation of the strategy as a much more team-based
effort. A combination of the manager, department heads, consultants. and the candidate
determined which voter groups to target and in planning for media advertising.
Though respondents did not describe any sort of internal vision that each campaign
manager had for their campaign organizations, campaign managers did have some guiding

principles or objectives for the staff of the organizations. This guiding objective was a
broad principle for how the managers thought the campaign organization should be run.
Interestingly, all four campaign managers emphasized two simple objectives for their
respective staffs to meet in order for the staff to run the internal organization effectively.
The first principle was to never be wasteful, always be efficient, and the second, was to
understand your responsibilities and job and do it. In other words, if one person was
writing a speech for the candidate, then five other people need not be doing the same
thing. If you are a part of the press department, your primary focus should be advertising
and press releases, not speech writing.
Similar to the questions asked regarding the campaign manager, respondents were
also asked about the role of the candidate as a micro-manager. The respondents in
campaigns two and three described their candidates as either minimally or appropriately
involved in details. For example, in campaign two the candidate would personally sign
thank you cards to donors, in a good will effort, to show that the candidate cared about
people. In campaign one and four, the candidates were also appropriately involved in such
things as preparing for the individual's own debates, but they were also overly involved in
other aspects. Campaign one respondents felt that the individual was overly involved in
scheduling and believed that he or she always knew best which events to attend and which
not to attend.
Respondents felt that the candidate was heavily involved in the strategy of all four
of the campaigns. Respondents described campaign one as the brain child of the
candidate, who had been planning this race for years. In campaigns one and two the

candidates created or founded the idea of creating their own field or volunteer
organization.

Campaign Manager's Experience
Overall, past experience of the campaign manager tended to play a tremendous
role in the effectiveness of the campaign organization. All four of the managers had
worked on races in the past, and some had managed races before, giving them what
respondents saw as valuable learning experiences. For example, respondents in campaign
one stated that their manager had a strong will, was resilient, and would not back away
from opponent's attacks. In campaign two, respondents said that the manager could
foresee mistakes before they occurred based on past experience, and that the manager also
had a second-sense about Virginia politics, having worked in Virginia election campaigns
before.
More specifically, the respondents in campaigns three and four felt that the
manager's past experience had no effect on the media coverage or the way the media was
handled by the campaign. These respondents felt that the press people and the media
consultants deserve much more credit for how the media was handled. In contrast,
respondents in the other two campaigns felt that their managers knew the crafty nature of
the media and could react well to that nature. For instance, in campaign two the manager
was praised for the ability to prevent the candidate from attacking the media because they
portrayed the candidate falsely or in a negative manner.
Three of the campaigns had respondents who split in their feelings about the role
of the manager in fundraising. Only campaign four had respondents who felt that all of the
credit for fundraising should go to the finance director. Similarly, many in the other

campaigns agreed that responsibility for fundraising went to the fundraising director (same

position as the finance director), as well. However, many others also believed that if the

campaign manager knew donors from past Virginia election campaigns, he or she

facilitated fundraising by providing an "in" to tap those resources. Furthermore, the
manager in campaign three was praised for national contacts that brought in a lot of
money into the state campaign.

The same split in opinions that occurred with respect to opinions about fundraising

in the campaigns also was evident with respect to views on the effects of the manager's

experience on party support. Many people said the manager helped garner party support,

while others said that the manager either had no effect or actually turned off party patrons.

The manager in campaign two was often cited as a person whose past service to the party
made that individual well known among local party leaders in various areas of the state,
aiding the effort to increase the breadth of the campaign's support.
Culture of the CampaiK17 Or[.;anization

Loyalty and dedication, followed closely by honesty, were the most popular

responses as descriptors of the organizational culture of all four of the campaigns.

Respondents from campaign three would often tell me about the long days and hours that
they put into the campaign, but they said they never complained because they believed in

the candidate. Many respondents from campaign one told me that the openness of the
campaign and the effort by at least some senior staff members to listen to lower staff

members helped to created a culture of honesty within the organization. Respondents

from campaigns two and three also emphasized the degree of focus within the campaign
organization. They told me that everyone in the organization worked consistently on

reinforcing the message that the candidate was trying to communicate to the voters. In
other words, everyone tried to link everything in their work to the candidate's message.
Furthermore, almost every respondent cited the candidate as responsible for the
level of honesty, loyalty, and focus within the organization. When the staff knew that the
candidate was out traveling and not coming home for weeks at a time, they identified with
the candidate. As a result of this "model" image of the candidate, respondents told me
they felt as if they were working directly with the candidate and that the two of them were
working together to win the election. This identification with the candidate led
respondents to realize that everyone needed to make sacrifices for their organization to be
a success.

Level of Grassroots Support
The level of grassroots support was considered high by every respondent in
campaigns one, two, and three. AJmost all of the respondents also cited the method for
accruing such a high grassroots turnout as local networks. Respondents in these three
campaigns cited how the senior staff divided the state into volunteer-based precincts and
then recruited volunteers to man these field organizations. Respondents cited very strong
rapport and communication networks with local politicians as the source for mobilizing
the volunteers. Respondents in campaign two talked extensively of the backyard
barbecues held in honor of the candidate. the large number of small donations garnered at
such events, and the many field events or rallies held.
Responsibility for the success of the grassroots campaigns varied according to
campaign. Campaign two emphasized the travel of the candidate and that individual's
desire to meet and know people as the cause of the high grassroots support. Campaigns

one and three cited their respective field or organizational directors as responsible for
building a network oflocal political leaders and encouraging them to drum up local
volunteerism.
Campaign four was seen as poor in its grassroots effort because respondents
believed that it ignored important racial groups in its get-out-the-vote effort.
Furthermore, respondents held both the candidate and campaign manager responsible for
the lack of grassroots effort. They believed that the decision not to mobilize certain ethnic
groups came from the top of the campaign, and therefore they were responsible for the
result.

Messal{es of the Campaigns
According to respondents, campaigns one, two, and three ran solely on messages
that were very policy oriented or substantive in nature. For example, all four campaigns
included education, its importance to Virginia, and what the candidate could do for
education within their campaign messages. However. respondents from campaign four
added that it also used a more nebulous and less concrete message, the idea that their
candidate was the best leader for Virginia.
Most respondents in all four campaigns also placed responsibility for the message
in the candidate's hands. They all stated that the message presented to the voters was
based upon the principles of the candidate, and that any outside influence on the message
was merely for the purpose of packaging an appealing message. For example, the
candidate would create the idea of promoting education, but the campaign manager, media
consultant, or general consultant would create the slogan used to convey that message to
the voters.

There was similar consistency across campaigns with regard to negative
advertising that appeared during campaigns. All of the respondents argued, as stated
above, that the candidates themselves did not want to go negative. A common belief
among the candidates, according to respondents, was that one should run on his or her
own record and give people a reason to voter for him or her through that record.
However, as most respondents argued, at the end of the election the campaign leaders felt
that they were forced to go negative in order to defend their respective candidate against
attacks from the opponent, and to counteract the opponent's lies. Respondents in
campaigns one and two claimed that they went negative in order to defend against the
character attacks on their candidate and to show that their candidate's record on certain
substantive issues was better than the opponent's record. Campaign three was the only
campaign with respondents who argued that they went negative for the purpose of not
only comparing the records of the respective candidates, but also to set the record straight
as to the opponent's lies on certain issues. In all of the campaigns, these messages
appeared to be secondary to the candidate's principle message (e.g. education) were
crafted by media consultants, and based on reactionary and retaliatory actions.
The respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the message of their respective
campaigns. Many agreed because they believed in the principles or policy illustrated by
the message, but some believed in the message merely because they believed in the
candidate. In other words, some conservative respondents would agree with the
respective conservative candidate because they believed in a smaller, less intrusive
government, while others would agree merely because they identified with and were
devoted to that candidate.

CampaiK17 Manager as a Leader
The final two questions asked respondents to identify their respective campaign
managers as leaders, managers, both, or neither, and why they believed this. The majority
of respondents found their managers to exhibit leadership behaviors, followed by a mixture
of both leader and managerial behaviors, followed by solely managerial behaviors. By a
small majority respondents in campaign one found their manager to be a poor leader and a
poor manager, respondents in campaign two found their manager to be a leader,
respondents in campaign three found their manager to be a manager, and respondents in
campaign four found their manager to be a combination of both manager and leader.
Those who responded that their manager exhibited managerial behaviors said they
felt this way because their manager coordinated the entire campaign and also monitored
people to make sure they were doing their jobs. Many respondents said the manager made
sure the trains ran on time and that people in the press department were not doing the
same job as people in the field department. In fact, respondents from campaign three
explained that they believed their campaign manager was a poor manager precisely
because that individual did not coordinate various departments and did not gain loyalty
from lower staff members. Respondents told me that a lower staff member could tell the
manager that he or she had lined up 2,000 volunteers for a rally the next week and the
manager would never check to see if this figure was accurate.
Respondents who claimed that their manager exhibited some leadership behaviors
cited ethics, respect of lower staff, and inspirational effects as evidence of the leadership of
the manager. Respondents in campaign three stressed that their manager embodied the
campaign's culture of honesty and acted consistently in an honest manner, becoming a role

model for other staff members to be honest. Conversely, respondents in campaign three
said that their manager was a poor leader because that individual did not provide
inspiration for others. That individual cut both senior and lower staff members out of the
decision making process, discouraging team decision making, and lowering the morale and
energy of the staff Finally, respondents in campaign two explained that their manager
showed good leadership because the staff respected the individual for listening to their
views on issues. Respondents told me that even the person who mailed out campaign
literature could be heard and would have their ideas taken seriously.
It should be noted, however, that across respondents characterizations of what is
leadership and what is management overlapped. For example, some respondents saw
conflict resolution as both a leadership and a managerial behavior. Campaign four
respondents saw conflict resolution as being managerial in nature because their manager
constantly put out "brush fires", or petty fights among campaign staff. However,
campaign one respondents viewed the same issue as leadership because their manager was
able to inspire others to cohere on issues by acting as role model and searching for
common ground when he or she was involved in a contentious situation_ Similarly, one
respondent might claim that a campaign manager with a focus on winning or on a
consistent campaign message was showing good leadership by communicating a guiding
vision and inspiring staff members to follow that vision. Another respondent would call
such focus management because the manager constantly monitored them, giving staff
members notice if they appeared to be heading off message in their work. Neither of the
above characterizations was made by a majority of the respondents, so they should not
skew interpretation of the data.

ln conclusion, three points seem evident from the results reported above. First,
some of the ideas that the respondents saw as positive or negative structural or general
characteristics of the campaigns tended to coincide greatly with the characteristics of
effectiveness cited in the literature review. Both the results and the literature review
emphasize the importance of an open communication structure, empowered lower staff
members, and a cohesive team among staff members. A second feature of potential
importance is the emphasis or lack thereof of the campaign manager as a focal point in the
campaign structure. Respondents mentioned the manager as an important part of the
hierarchical and communicational structure of the campaign, but they only mentioned the
manager within the context of a team of other people important in these activities.
Furthermore, they consistently emphasized the candidate as being responsible for the
positive concepts of energy, organizational culture, and message within the campaign,
while the campaign manager was seen as responsible for money management, use or
control over the media, and relations between the campaign and the field organization.
Finally. it may be important to note that when asked to describe the role of the campaign
manager the most popular roles cited by respondents were the traditionally administrative
tasks of running the day-to-day operation of the campaign and managing the spending of
money, with conflict resolution being the only consistent traditional leadership behavior
mentioned.
Discussion
The following three-part discussion interprets the results based on the extent to
which the campaign manager in political campaigns is best characterized as a leader,
manager, or both within those organizations. I will interpret the results based on

predictions made within the first section of this paper, outline the limitations of my study
and provide future directions for further study, and suggest a possible framework for
understanding the role of the campaign manager as a leader.
The political campaign literature strongly suggests the importance of clear and
open communication networks as a necessary condition for productive political
campaigns. My research findings not only support this argument, but also add to the
substance of why communication is important to a political campaign. The results section
illustrated that weekly staff meetings were held in each of the four campaigns, indicating
that consistency and frequency in intra-campaign communication is highly valued by
members of a political campaign. Respondents spoke of a feeling of cohesiveness or
inclusiveness that resulted from such frequent meetings and the ability of lower staff to
provide input into the decision making of the campaign. In fact, in campaign one. the
campaign in which respondents felt left out of the campaign manager's decision making,
the department heads created their own weekly departmental meetings. Though there is
no apparent causal link between the campaign manager's excessive control of decision
making and the departmental meetings, it is clear that staff members value communication,
and more importantly. value an upward. as well as downward communication flow.
The political literature also suggests that the campaign manager is integral to
creating an atmosphere characterized by closed decision making among elite campaign
leaders, or one characterized by open decision making among a11 campaign staff members.
Past national campaigns, such as Bob Dole's 1996 campaign for President, illustrate that
campaign managers who have excessively guarded the decision making process have
created attrition among staff members. Although my results show that the manager is

important in the communication network, they fail to show that he or she holds the sole
responsibility for the opened versus closed nature of the decision making process. In fact,
the formal structures described by respondents often showed that the manager was placed
on the same hierarchical level as department heads or consultants, and appeared to serve
as an intermediary between the candidate and the lower staff (See Appendix II).
Placing the campaign manager at the same organizational level as other department
heads is important because it may provide indications for describing the role of the
campaign manager as a leader. Though the campaign manager may still be considered a
leader, he or she may be best characterized as a subordinate leader under the candidate or
a co-leader among the department heads and consultants. For example, respondents
within all four campaigns described the campaign manager as part of a team including
consultants and department heads in developing the campaign strategy. This team-based
leadership does not preclude the manager from being a visionary leader, or one who
communicates a plan for how the organization will reach a desired state, victory.
However, scholars may be narrowing their focus too much if they neglect to look at the
importance of the press secretary, consultant, candidate, and other senior staff members
with regard to the same function.
As illustrated in the discussion above, some national campaigns have had
troublesome side effects based on excessive managerial control over information. In this
study, campaign one illustrates additional effects of excessive managerial control based on
lower staff complaints of feeling left out of the campaign manager's decision making.
Therefore, many of these lower staff members bypassed the manager in communications
and went directly to the candidate.

With regard to the study of leadership, Social Exchange Theory seems to best
explain the effects of staff members bypassing the campaign manager in decision making.
In campaign one, respondent answers showed that the manager refused to exchange
information, a valuable resource, with the lower staff. As a result, the staff became
frustrated with their inability to provide input into the decision making process and refused
to share their information with the campaign manager. The staff refused to give their
trust, another valuable resource, to the campaign manager. This resulted in both parties
ceasing to engage in exchanges of these resources. The staff, seeking another exchange
relationship, substituted the candidate-staff exchange relationship for the manager-staff
relationship. In essence, the staff entered an in-group relationship with the candidate,
while the campaign manager lost influence within the organization as his/her relationship
with the staff became an out-group relationship.
According to the political campaign literature, another area of importance for an
effective campaign is the organizational hierarchy of a campaign. The literature
hypothesizes that it is important for campaign managers to create a working environment
where staff members clearly understand that they have specific and designated duties and
responsibilities within the campaign. The literature goes on to say that without this clarity
and designation of responsibilities staff become confused on how to carry out the
campaign's strategy for winning. My results, however, show that this lack of clarity can
actually be a double-edged sword. Respondents in all of the campaigns identified the
autonomy and self-directed nature of the campaign as both a major strength and weakness
of the campaign. As the results show, some of the autonomy and lack of boundaries for
staff responsibilities led to such positive effects as obtaining ideas for political commercials

from the candidate's driver. However, at other times this same autonomy encouraged
staff members to pursue independent and contradictory directions.
Although the conclusion that autonomy is both a strength and a weakness seems
contradictory, this finding is important because it illustrates the need for balance within a
campaign. Empowerment and the campaign leaders' use of the ideas of lower staff
members are positive aspects of autonomy, while duplication, waste, and contradictory
staff objectives are negative aspects. Perhaps what an effective campaign may need is a
campaign manager who can use a mix of transactional and transformational behaviors to
balance the level of control and autonomy within the campaign. It may be important that
the campaign manager transform, inspire, and raise staff members to the level of influential
leaders by using their ideas in strategic decisions, such as in generating ideas for campaign
commercials. At the same time, as respondents in campaign one pointed out, the
campaign manager may also need to exhibit the transactional behavior of punishing staff
with less authority or restricted authority when they are wasteful or inefficiently spend
money. The effective campaign manager may be the one who can both inspire campaign
staff and check up on campaign staff to gain assurance of their completion of duties.
The political literature also strongly emphasizes the need for someone, namely the
campaign manager, within the campaign hierarchy to organize and mobilize a large
volunteer or field effort. Past literature on national campaigns shows that such a strong
field base can make the difference between a winning and losing campaign. My results
support the importance of a large field organization because respondents in campaigns
one, three, and four argued that the lack of emphasis on field work was a major weakness
in their respective campaigns, while respondents in campaign two argued that their

campaign's strong emphasis on grassroots was greatly beneficial to the campaign
organization. Respondents said that they felt more energized and confident about their
candidate because of the large, adoring crowds that came to meet him or her at rallies.
My results also support the importance of the campaign manager in facilitating a
large grassroots effort. Respondents in campaign four blamed both the candidate and
campaign manager for not showing concern for important ethnic constituencies around the
state, resulting in what they believe to be lower ethnic turnout at election time. The
importance of this finding may be twofold. First, campaign managers who face such
criticism may need to use visionary leadership to create and communicate a plan for
mobilizing a large grassroots effort. Secondly, candidates need to make better use of their
referent power and ability to gain the respect and identification of the average voter with
themselves or their campaigns. In order to be effective at grassroots mobilization, both
parties need to work together to create a vision for how the campaign is going to help the
average constituent and use clear and convincing communication skills to persuade those
constituents to identify with and "buy into" the vision.
Campaign coalitions with leaders of the state political party represent another area
hypothesized as important for an effective campaign. The literature placed responsibility
with the campaign manager for the strength of such coalitions. Though my results show
campaign ties with the state party to be important to a campaign organization, they also
emphasize that such ties should be with the local party chairs within the state because
those are the people responsib]e for mobi1izing volunteers. In campaign one, respondents
argued that the manager had poor rapport with local party chairs, and as a result the
grassroots effort never experienced complete cohesion and full mobilization towards

victory. Some respondents indicated that when local party leaders do not identify with the
campaign manager because they view that individual as an outsider to the state, the
campaign's ability to create coalitions dissipates. In other words, managers who are
viewed as outsiders by local party chairs are unable to use their referent power and
influence tactics such as bargaining or persuasion to form party-campaign coalitions.
The third major grouping of predictions based on the campaign literature fall under
the heading of strategic vision. The literature proposes that it is critical for campaigns to
create fundraising and spending strategies early on in the campaign so as to have sufficient
funds to cover the high costs of political advertising. The results of this study clearly
show that money was at the forefront of the minds of many respondents during the
campaign. Generally respondents stated that one of the greatest strengths of their
respective organizations was the ample campaign funds, which increased their confidence
in the advertising ability of the campaign. At the same time, respondents in campaigns one
and two both roundly criticized money management as one of the major weaknesses of
their campaigns. In these campaigns, mishandled spending was believed to have alienated
important voter groups, and decreased staff morale because the candidate did not even
have enough money to stay in a hotel when on-the-road.
The campaign literature suggests that the campaign manager should play an
important role in the creation of a strategy for fundraising and the spending of campaign
funds. According to the results, respondents in campaigns one, two, and three did suggest
that one of the campaign manager's major ro]es was to be a money manager. However,
unlike the suggestions in the campaign literature, respondents believed the campaign
manager's role in relation to monetary matters should be strictly limited to the spending

side of the campaign. This is important because it focuses the role of the campaign
manager on administrative and managerial tasks. The managers in these campaigns clearly
used their legitimate authority to dispense funds to lower level staff Respondents
described the managers as knowing and deciding where every major campaign expenditure
went. In sum, these monetary exchanges between the campaign manager and the staff
were transactional exchanges because the manager gave the staff members money in
exchange for their compliance on how the money would be spent.
With respect to strategy, the political literature also strongly hypothesizes that the
campaign manager plays a role, along with the candidate, in creating a consistent message
and strategy for the campaign. Campaigns without such consistency on both issues are
portrayed as being 'lost in the woods' and composed of confused staff members.
Nthough my respondents unanimously placed sole responsibility for the campaign
message with the candidate, they did observe that it was important for the campaign
manager and candidate to be in agreement with regard to strategy. Respondents in
campaigns one and four illustrated what happens when such conflict does occur. The
campaign manager and candidate disagreed often on campaign strategy and as a result
these leaders would procrastinate on decisions, or even worse, the campaign manager and
candidate would pursue divergent strategic directions. The staff never knew whether to
follow the lead of the campaign manager or the lead of the candidate with regard to
strategy, and as a result became confused.
In brief the results suggest that both campaign managers and candidates need to
realize when conflicts over strategy arise and take action to better utilize their respective
power bases to resolve these conflicts. Focusing on the campaign manager, he/she would

want to use expert power and referent power in order to encourage the candidate to agree
with him/her. If the campaign manager has the trust and respect of the candidate, he or
she can emphasize this trust or his or her extensive knowledge on the subject in order to
coax the candidate into agreement.
The literature on strategy and political campaigns neglected to address this study' s
query of whether or not it is necessary for a campaign manager to balance his or her
strategic focus. By this I mean does the campaign manager need a balance between a
higher order strategy for winning the election and an operational strategy for motivating
the staff so that they can make winning happen? As illustrated above, the results show
that the campaign managers in all four campaigns became heavily involved in the strategy
for winning the election; however, none of the campaign managers created an internal,
operational vision for how staff members would achieve this broader vision. Instead,
respondents discussed two internal principles that aII staff were to follow: Be efficient and
understand your job and do it. Though these rules seem overly simplistic, respondents felt
like these rules provided enough direction for them to do their jobs.
In light of the low value respondents placed on the need for an operational
strategy, there may be an explanation for why a balance between the emphasis on higher
order and operational strategy was not necessary in the four cases studied in this paper.
The four campaigns in this study were all characterized by strong self-directed and
autonomous staff Hence, the staff became empowered leaders themselves, and perhaps
they had their own operational strategy for winning. This self-leadership may have
negated the need for a campaign manager with a leadership-based, operational strategy for
winning. Future research should explore this possibility.

The final major hypothesis extrapolated from the political literature proposed that
the campaign manager has a responsibility to make sure that the candidate does not
excessively control the strategic direction of the campaign or become a micro-manager.
The candidate needs to temper his or her level of involvement because over-involvement
in the strategy or details can detract from the amount of attention the candidate can give
to meeting the voters and sending a message to them. My results support part of this
hypothesis, with respondents agreeing that both the campaign manager and candidate
needed to temper their involvement in details. For example, respondents argued that the
candidate should have input into the details of debate preparation, but should not be so
involved as to personally plan every event that he or she will attend. Likewise, the
campaign manager should periodically check up on the completion of assigned tasks, but
should noi constantly look over staff members' backs as occurred in campaign three. My
results diverge from the literature with regard to strategy, showing that respondents
believed that the campaign manager and candidate should both be heavily involved in
creating the strategic direction of the campaign. They seemed to agree with Lee Atwater,
Bush's campaign manager, that both organizational members can make strategic calls that
can mean the difference between winning or losing the campaign.
The findings in this area of campaign management have two implications for the
study of leadership. First, they show that both the campaign manager and candidate need
to be empowering and transforming leaders with regard to their involvement in both the
strategy and details of the campaign. They need to entrust, empower, and delegate a
substantial portion of responsibility for strategy and details to lower staff members, aiding
those staff members in becoming self-directed leaders. Secondly, these two leaders within

the campaign need to recognize that through such empowerment, they will be engaging in
a very important social exchange relationship. By giving up the resource of control or
responsibility over certain aspects of the campaign to lower staff members those staff
members become more likely to grant a higher levels of trust to and identification with the
campaign leaders, raising the level of influence and status of those leaders within the
organization.
The first section of this paper isolated eight categorical themes, in addition to the
four already discussed, which I hypothesized to be of importance to an effective campaign.
Of those eight themes, mutual trust and respect among campaign staff. strong grassroots
efforts, the importance of details, and the confidence level of the campaign staff have all
been implicitly discussed above. With regard to the other four themes, my results
supported in some cases and negated in other cases the relative importance of these
notions. My results supported the literature finding that an emphasis on opposition
research, and the ability to control campaign leaks are of minor importance to a campaign
manager and an effective campaign. Respondents in all four campaigns never mentioned
difficulty with campaign leaks nor saw the prevention of such campaign leaks as a major
strength of the campaign or the campaign manager. Additionally, respondents de
emphasized the importance of negative advertising and opposition research. Respondents
only suggested that these actions were used at the end of the campaign, and only then to
save a losing campaign or to distance their campaign from the opposing campaign.
The value of the experience of the campaign leaders and the energy level of the
campaign were areas that this study might have given greater emphasis. Respondents in
all four campaigns strongly indicated that the past experience of the campaign manager

was invaluable because he or she was able to use that experience to foresee pitfalls that the
respective campaigns might face. Furthermore, these individuals appeared more resilient
and able to 'roll with the punches' enhancing the stability of the campaign organization.
With regard to energy level, respondents in many of the campaigns named this
characteristic as a major strength of their respective campaigns. Energy level was seen by
respondents as responsible for a high level of cohesiveness among campaign staff and
valuable for aiding the organization during slumps throughout the election. Generally,
future studies should place greater emphasis on probing respondents about the importance
of campaign leaders' past experience and the overall energy level of the campaign
organization.

Limitations and Future Directions
A few other limits of this current study and directions for future studies make
themselves abundantly clear at this stage of my analysis. First, this study merely asked for
descriptions about the formal structure of the respective campaign organizations without
probing into the effects of such chosen structures. A study that probes deeper into those
effects may glean valuable information about the effect of the formal position of the
campaign manager on his or her ability to be an effective leader.
Another finding of this study was that half of the campaign organizations studied
used a team leadership structure composed of various department heads, the campaign
manager, consultants, and the candidate. Within this structure, this study failed to probe
deeper into what respondents in all four campaigns cited as the most popular strength for
all four campaigns, the competence of the people involved in the campaign. Future studies
on leadership within political campaigns may want to be careful not to focus too narrowly

on one individual within the leadership structure of campaign organizations. Such a
narrow focus may neglect to reveal other important and influential actors within the
organization, fail to recognize major sources of inspiration within the organization, and fail
to describe important leadership relationships among campaign leaders and the effects of
such relationships on the campaign organization.
My results on organizational culture also reveal potentially important areas for
further analysis. Respondents in all four of the campaigns characterized the culture of
their campaign organizations as composed of honesty, dedication, and loyalty. Though
respondents indicated that the candidate, as a role model, was responsible for this culture,
future studies may want to explore the reliability of this conclusion across various
campaign organizations. These studies may find that other campaign organizations see the
campaign manager as the source of such culture, especially if he/she communicates an
organizational culture through an internal vision for the staff. Additionally, future studies
would want to seek how the individual or individuals responsible for the organizational
culture communicate this culture and why respondents in some cases internalize it and in
other cases fail to do so.
Leadership theory may also have more to add to future studies of campaign
leadership. A consistent theme mentioned in respondents' answers was an emphasis on
the role of the campaign manager in preventing conflict, or "back biting," within the
organization, the negative impact of conflict on the organization, and control conflicts
between the campaign consultants and campaign managers. Leadership theory and
findings from leadership studies on intra-group conflict, influence tactics that promote

conflict, or the role of misperceptions in conflict situations may provide valuable
infonnation for campaign managers wishing to prevent or mediate campaign conflicts.
Along similar lines, findings of studies concerned with leadership substitutes and
leadership neutralizers may offer important insights into the further study of the campaign
manager as a leader. As mentioned earlier, respondents in certain campaigns would talk
about bypassing the campaign manager in decision making processes, the self-directed
nature of the campaign staff. and the role of the candidate or consultants in undennining
the influence of the campaign manager. Perhaps such situations can be better understood
when analyzed within the framework ofleadership neutralizers and substitutes. For
example, the self-directed nature of the campaign staff, their cohesiveness, and their
competence may provide substitutes for a campaign manager's operational strategy. Such
characteristics may allow staff members to motivate and provide direction for themselves
and each other, with no need for centralized leadership.
A final limitation of this study is its emphasis on only four gubernatorial
campaigns, with only a sampling of representatives of those campaigns. Future studies
certainly need to extend this study to state legislative races and Congressional races to
determine the generalizability of the results of this research. Additionally, the validity of
the findings of this study would also be increased if gubernatorial campaigns in other
states were studied and if data were collected from a larger sample of campaigns and
respondents.

Conclusion
The results of this study draw no definitive conclusion as to the desirability of the
campaign manager as solely a manager, or solely a leader. Respondents for each of the

respective campaigns suggest slightly different conclusions about the nature of the
campaign manager as a leader, manager, both, or neither. Some respondents saw their
respective managers as merely money managers or administrative coordinators of the
campaign departments, while others saw them as leaders who resolved conflict, provided a
strategy, communicated a vision, and created empowered lower staff In light of the
diverse and varied conclusions drawn by the respondents, the only conclusion I feel
confident in drawing is that an effective campaign manager needs to have the ability to be
both a leader and a manager. Only further studies can enhance the validity of this
conjecture, but my conclusion is that the effective campaign manager is both the individual
who 'makes the trains run on time' and the individual with a vision for the future and the
ability to communicate that vision to others.

Appendix I
I. Describe your role/responsibilities within the campaign organization.
A How did you remain informed about what was going on in the organization?
I . From whom did you usually receive information?
2. To whom did you give the information you received?
3. How accurate was the information you received?
4. How timely was the information you received?
5. How adequate was the information you received?
6. Describe the fonnal channels of communication for the campaign?
7. What were the reasons for choosing these channels?
8. What were the strengths of this structure?
9. What, if any. were the weaknesses of this structure?
B. What were some positive characterstics of the campaign?
I. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such
characteristics?
2. How did these characteristics come about?
3. Why did you feel positive?
4. What were some of the negative characteristics of the campaign?
5. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such
characteristics?
6. How did these characteristics come about?
7. Why did you feel negative?
C. How confident were you that the campaign organization was going to be
successful?
I. Why did you feel confident?
2. How did this confidence begin?
3. How did this confidence grow?
4. How did cohesion among the staff affect the confidence level?
5. How did monetary donations affect the confidence level?
II Describe the role of the campaign manager in the campaign.
A How would you characterize the relationship between the campaign manager
and the candidate?
I. What explains the reasons for the nature of this relationship?
2. How did this relationship affect you?
3. Describe the campaign manager's level of involvement in details, ie
scheduling.
4. Describe the campaign manager's level of involvement in the strategic
vision of the campaign.
5. Did the campaign manager have vision for the staff and internal
organization of the campaign?
6. Describe the candidate's level of involvement in details, ie scheduling.
7. Describe the candidate's level of involvement in the strategic vision of
the campaign.

B. What role, if any, did the campaign manager's previous campaign experience
have on the effectiveness of the organization?
l. How did this affect you?
2. How did this affect the media publicity of the campaign?
3. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to raise funds?
4. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to garner party support?
III. Describe the culture of the campaign organization.
A What assumptions were important in the decision making of the campaign?
I . What beliefs were important in the decision making of the campaign?
2. What values were important in the decision making of the campaign?
3. Who, if anyone, was responsible for creating and facilitating this
culture?
4. How was this culture created?
B. Characterize the level of grassroots support.
I. How did the campaign gain support from volunteers?
2. How did the campaign gain support from the party rank and file?
3. Who coordinated this effort?
C. Describe the message the campaign tried to communicate to voters.
1. To what extent did it involve negative campaigning?
2. Why?
3. To what extent did the message involve positive images?
4. Why?
5. How was this message created?
6. To what extent did you believe in the message?
7. Why?
IV. From your perspective would you describe the campaign manager in your campaign
as a leader, manager. combonation, or neither?
A Why do you believe this?

Campaign One

Appendix II

Department
Heads

Lower Staff

Campaign Two

Deot. Heads

Lower Staff

Campaign Three

CamoaiQ:n Manal!er

Consultants

Lower Staff

CampaiKfl Four
1------Kitchen Cabinet

Deot. Heads

Lower Staff

Appendix

1998.

m

Allen, Hon. G. Candidate, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 23.

Allen, R. Policy Director, Grassroots Coordinator, George Allen's Gubernatorial
g
p
Cam ai n. General Consultant, Communication Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial
Campaign. March 12, 1998 _
Beamer, B. Finance Director, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March
12, }998.
Benedetti, T. Finance Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign. March
20, 1998.
] 998.
1998.

Beyer, Hon. D. Candidate, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 23,
Boinest, P. Press Secretary, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign_ March 25,

Bowman, B. Deputy Director of the Joint Campaign, Mary Sue Terry's
Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998.
1998.

Brinkerhoff, B. Schedular, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 26,

Britton, K. Executive Secretary, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign
March 25, 1998.
Brown. M. Deputy Campaign Manager, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign
March 22, 1998.
Carter, M.R. Western Regional Finance Coordinator, George Allen's
Gubernatorial Campaign. March 16, I 998.
Clark, P. Eastern Regional Field Director, George Allen's and Jim Gilmore's
Gubernatorial Campaigns. March 16, 1998.
Coleman, K. Southampton Field Director, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial
Campaign. March 11, 1998.
Elliott, C. State Director, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998.

Fowler, B. Volunteer Coordinator. Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign.
March 12, 1998.
Jolly, A. Assistant to the Financial Director, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial
Campaign. March 26, 1998.
King, T. General Consultant, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign. March
24. 1998.
Olson, R. Schedular, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998.
1998.

Platt, S. Campaign Manager, Don Beyer's Gubernatorial Campaign. March 29,

Rimmler, A. Director of Financial Operations, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial
Campaign. March 28, 1998.
Russell, V. Volunteer Coordinator, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign
March 12. 1998.
Slater, B. Campaign Manager, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign. March
20, 1998.
Terry, Hon. M. S. Candidate, Mary Sue Terry's Gubernatorial Campaign. March
20, 1998.
Thomas, M. Campaign Manager, George Allen's Gubernatorial Campaign.
March 20. 1998.
Timmons, J. Deputy Campaign Manager, George Allen's Gubernatorial
Campaign. March 16, I 998.
Whyte, C. Director of Scheduling, Jim Gilmore's Gubernatorial Campaign
March 23, 1998.

Works Cited
AJter, J. (1996, November 4). A man not of this time: One of dole's key 1996
strategists explains why it's all over but the pouting. Newsweek. 128, 30.
Barnes, J.A (1996, September 14). A new crew for dole's troubled ship.
National Journal, 28. 1968.
Bass, B.M. (1985). Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations. New
York: The Free Press.
Bennis, W. (I 995). The artform ofleadership. In Wren, J.T. (Ed.), The Leader's
Companion: Insights on Leadership Through the Ages. New York: The Free Press.
Bennis, W. & Nanus. B. (1985). Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge.
New York: Harper & Row.
Breckhard. R., & Pritchard, W. (I 995). Choosing a fundamental change strategy.
In Wren, J.T. (Ed.), The Leader's Companion: Insights on Leadership Through the Ai§.
New York: The Free Press.
Burns, J.M. (1978). Leadership. New York: Harper Torchbooks
Cashman. J., Dansereau. F., Jr.• Graen, G., & Haga, W.J. (1976). Organizational
understructure and leadership: A longitudinal investigation of the managerial role-making
process. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.
Corsino, L. ( 1985). A case study of campaign conflict and games. Research in
Political Sociology, 7, 252, 256-257.
8.

Dettmer, J. (1996, December 2). Where it went wrong. Insight on the News, 12.
Don't look now. (1996, November 18). Newsweek, 128, 106
Duffy, M. (1992, July 27). Waiting for Baker. Time, 140, 44

Forsyth, D.R. (1990). Group Dynamics. California: Brooks/Cole Publishing
Company.
Garland, S. (1995, April 10). Harold ickes is tough. Tough enough to reelect
bill? Business Week. 36.

Hughes, R.L., Ginnett, R.C., &Curphy, G.J. (1995) Power. influence, and
influence tactics In Wren, J.T. (Ed), The Leader's Companion: Insights on Leadership
Through the Ages. New York: The Free Press.
11.28.

Knapper, D (] 996, September 23 ). Heed the hustings of hustlers. Brandweek,

Luntz, F.I. (1988). Candidates, Consultants. and Campaigns: The Style and
Substanc_e_of American Electioneering. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Margolis, M. (1985). The 1984 presidential campaign and the future of election
studies. Congress and the Presidency, 12, 124.
Martin, A. L (1993). Keys to political victory: A model of election to the offic of
county superintendent of schools (Doctoral Dissertation, University of La Verne, 1993).
Dissertation Abstracts International, 54- lOA, 3 64 7.
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G.B. (1995). Designing Qualitative Research.
California: SAGE Publications, Inc
Newcomb, T.M. (1960). Varieties of interpersonal attraction. In D. Cartwright
and A. Zander (Eds.), Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. Illinois: Row, Peterson.
Runkel, D.R. (Ed.). (1989). Campaign for President: The Managers Look at
'88. Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company.
Sanoff, A.P. (1980, April 28). It takes more than a candidate to win the white
house. U.S. News & World Report. 88, 68.
Sashkin, M. (1995). Visionary leadership. In Wren, J.T. (Ed.), The Leader's
Companion: Insights on Leadership Through the Ages. New York: The Free Press.
Tichy, N.M. & Devanna, M.A. (1986). The Transformational Leader. New
York: John Wiley.
Warren, D.I. ( 1968). Power, visibility, and conformity in formal organizations.
American Sociological Review, 6, 951-970.
Wayne, SJ. (1992). The Road to the White House 1992. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Wren, J.T. (] 995). The Leader's Companion: Insights on Leadership Through
the Ages New York: The Free Press.
Yuki, G. (I 994). Leadership in Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice Hall

